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Abstract
This paper explores time variation in the dynamic e⁄ects of technology shocks on
U.S. output, prices, interest rates as well as real and nominal wages. The results
indicate considerable time variation in U.S. wage dynamics that can be linked to
the monetary policy regime. Before and after the "Great In￿ ation", nominal wages
moved in the same direction as the (required) adjustment of real wages, and in the
opposite direction of the price response. During the "Great In￿ ation", technology
shocks in contrast triggered wage-price spirals, moving nominal wages and prices in
the same direction at longer horizons, thus counteracting the required adjustment
of real wages, amplifying the ultimate repercussions on prices and hence increasing
in￿ ation volatility. Using a standard DSGE model, we show that these stylized facts,
in particular the estimated magnitudes, can only be explained by assuming a high
degree of wage indexation in conjunction with a weak reaction of monetary policy
to in￿ ation during the "Great In￿ ation", and low indexation together with aggressive
in￿ ation stabilization of monetary policy before and after this period. This means that
the monetary policy regime is not only captured by the parameters of the monetary
policy rule, but importantly also by the degree of wage indexation and resultant second
round e⁄ects in the labor market. Accordingly, the degree of wage indexation is not
structural in the sense of Lucas (1976).
JEL classi￿cation: C32, E24, E31, E42, E52
Keywords: technology shocks, second-round e⁄ects, Great In￿ ation5
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In this paper, we examine the time-varying dynamic effects of technological 
disturbances on a set of key U.S. macroeconomic variables using data spanning the 
period 1947 till 2008. The focus of the analysis is on time variation in wage 
dynamics, which has so far remained unexplored in the literature. We find 
considerable time variation that can be linked to the monetary policy regime. More 
specifically, during the "Great Inflation", technology shocks triggered second-round 
effects via mutually reinforcing feedback effects between wages and prices, 
amplifying the ultimate effects on prices and hence increasing inflation variability. In 
contrast, before and after this period, nominal wages are found to move in the same 
direction as the required adjustment of real wages and in the opposite direction of the 
price response after technological innovations, contributing to a subdued impact on 
inflation and inflation volatility. 
Based on a standard DSGE model, we explore the explanations for these new 
stylized facts. Model-based simulations suggest that variations over time in both the 
policy rule parameters and the degree of wage indexation are needed in order to match 
the stylized facts established by the empirical analysis. What is needed is the 
combination of a low inflation reaction parameter in the policy rule and a high degree 
of wage indexation in the "Great Inflation" period and the combination of a high 
inflation reaction parameters and low wage indexation in the preceding and 
subsequent period. This implied simultaneous time variation of the inflation reaction 
parameter in the policy rule and the degree of wage indexation are two sides of the 
same coin, the monetary policy regime. A weakly inflation stabilizing policy rule is 
conducive to high and volatile inflation. This fosters the use of wage indexation 
clauses as protection against inflation uncertainty, which in turn contributes to 
inflation uncertainty by amplifying the effects of inflationary shocks. On the other 
hand, a regime of price stability requires a strong inflation stabilizing policy rule and 
reduces the need for protection against inflation uncertainty, thus mitigating wage 
indexation. A lower degree of wage indexation in turn reduces the effects of 
inflationary shocks, thus further contributing to price stability.  
The fact that the monetary policy regime is not only characterized by the 
parameters of the monetary policy rule, but also by the wage setting behavior in the 
labor market, has two important implications for policy analysis. First, counterfactual 
experiments by altering solely the monetary policy rule, often done in the context of 
the "Great Moderation" literature, do not adequately capture the wider consequences 
of a change in the policy regime that are shown to be very important. Second, a 
certain degree of wage indexation is typically embedded in micro-founded 
macroeconomic models, which could also be misleading when optimal monetary 
policy or significant regime changes in policy are analyzed. As pointed out by Benati 
(2008) in the context of inflation persistence, the degree of wage indexation is also 
not structural in the sense of Lucas (1976). 6
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1 Introduction
A growing literature has been investigating the underlying driving forces of the ￿Great
In￿ ation￿of the 1970s and the ￿Great Moderation￿in macroeconomic volatility since the
mid 1980s. Several studies, e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Gali, L￿pez-Salido
and VallØs (2003) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) argue that a shift in systematic
monetary policy can explain these phenomena. More speci￿cally, monetary policy has been
found to have overstabilized output at the cost of generating excessive in￿ ation variability
in the 1970s, and became more aggressive with respect to in￿ ation when Paul Volcker
became Fed chairman. However, a number of other studies conclude that the shift in the
systematic component of monetary policy is insu¢ cient or unable to explain the observed
changed macroeconomic volatility over time. Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006) and
Canova and Gambetti (2006) conduct counterfactual simulations with alternate monetary
policy rules and ￿nd limited consequences of changes in the policy rule parameters for the
dynamics and variability of output and in￿ ation across the regimes.1
The parameters of the policy rule may however not adequately capture the wider
macroeconomic implications of a change in the monetary policy regime. Indeed, there is a
widely held perception among policymakers that the incidence of so-called second-round
e⁄ects , i.e. the ampli￿cation of supply side shocks via mutually reinforcing feedback
e⁄ects between wages and prices arising from explicit or implicit indexation, ultimately
depend on the monetary policy regime (e.g. Bernanke 2004). More speci￿cally, second
round e⁄ects are perceived to have been signi￿cant as a result of unanchored in￿ ation
expectations and widespread indexation during the "Great In￿ ation" and to have vanished
with the ￿rm anchoring of in￿ ation expectations in the subsequent era of price stability.
This reasoning essentially re￿ ects the Lucas (1976) critique that a change in the policy
regime could have wider e⁄ects on empirical macroeconomic regularities, in this case on the
prevalence of indexation practices in wage setting. These wider potential e⁄ects of a change
1 Instead, they attribute the reduction in volatility to a changed variance of structural shocks a⁄ecting
the economy. Also Stock and Watson (2002) and Gambetti, Canova and Pappa (2008) ￿nd support for the
alternative "Good luck" hypothesis as the main explanation for greater macroeconomic stability in more
recent periods. On the other hand, Benati and Surico (2009) demonstrate that the impact of a change
in the systematic component of monetary policy may very well be identi￿ed as changes in the innovation
variances of other variables in these studies.7
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in the monetary policy regime are obviously not captured by the policy rule parameters
alone. While the link between indexation of prices, as re￿ ected in the degree of in￿ ation
persistence, and the monetary policy regime has recently been explored and established
(Benati 2008), the link between wage indexation and the monetary policy regime and its
wider implications for macroeconomic dynamics have so far remained unexplored.2 This
is all the more surprising given that the role of wage indexation played an important role
in the contemporary literature on the causes of the "Great In￿ ation" (e.g. Fischer 1983;
Bruno and Sachs 1985).
There is in fact institutional evidence supporting the conjecture that wage indexation
has not been constant over time and could be linked to the in￿ ation regime. Consider
Figure 1, which shows the coverage of private sector workers by cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA) clauses.3 The chart reveals that, from the late 1960s onwards, COLA coverage
steadily increased to levels around 60% in the mid 1980s, after which there was again a
decline towards 20% in the mid 1990s, when the reporting of COLA coverage has been
discontinued. Interestingly, as also shown in the ￿gure, we observe a substantial increase
in in￿ ation volatility and the correlation between price and wage in￿ ation during the
same period, suggesting that there is an interplay between the in￿ ation regime, wage
indexation and possibly second-round e⁄ects. A signi￿cant positive impact of in￿ ation
and in￿ ation uncertainty on the prevalence of COLA clauses included in major collective
wage bargaining agreements has also been found by Holland (1986, 1995) and Ragan and
Bratsberg (2000).4 However, while these studies can establish a link between the in￿ ation
2 Blanchard and Gali (2008) show that improved monetary policy credibility could have contributed to
more muted output and in￿ ationary e⁄ects of oil shocks since the mid 1980s, but do not provide evidence
for this hypothesis. Peersman and Van Robays (2009) ￿nd no second-round e⁄ects in the U.S. after oil
shocks, but focus only on the post-1985 period. A notably exception is a recent study by Blanchard and
Riggi (2009) who document vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of monetary
policy as a source for the lower impact of oil price shocks over time. Kilian (2009) and Baumeister and
Peersman (2008), however, show that oil price shocks cannot be compared over time due to structural
changes in the oil market.
3 COLA coverage obviously only measures explicit wage indexation in major wage agreements for
unionized workers and does therefore not capture explicit wage indexation in other wage agreements or
implicit wage indexation. However, Holland (1988) shows that COLA coverage is positively related to the
responsiveness of union, non-union and economy-wide wage aggregates to price level shocks and suggests,
based on this ￿nding, that COLA coverage is a suitable proxy for the overall prevalence of explicit and
implicit wage indexation in the U.S. economy.
4 Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1984) show in an e¢ cient contract model with risk averse workers that8
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regime and explicit indexation in collective bargaining agreements, they do not asses the
implications of this link for macroeconomic dynamics and volatility.
This paper aims to ￿ll this gap by inspecting time variation in U.S. wage dynamics
in response to technology shocks and its interrelation with the prevailing monetary policy
regime as well as with the dynamic responses of other key macro variables over the period
1957-2008. To this end we start by estimating an otherwise standard time-varying parame-
ters bayesian structural vector autoregression (TVP-BVAR) model including, besides the
usual set of macro variables, aggregate nominal wages. The results reveal some striking
and new stylized facts. First, the estimation of the reduced form VAR already supports
the idea of time variation in wage indexation. Whereas lagged price in￿ ation had a sig-
ni￿cant impact on wage in￿ ation until the early 1980s, we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect
afterwards. Second, when we consider the dynamic e⁄ects of technology shocks over time,
we ￿nd that before and after the high in￿ ation regime of the 1970s, nominal wages adjust
in a way that supports the required adjustment of real wages (i.e. both variables increase
after a positive technology shock, while the price level declines and output rises perma-
nently) and that the long-run e⁄ect of the shock on the price level is relatively mild. In
contrast, whereas the immediate response of nominal wages to a technology shock during
the "Great In￿ ation" is not very di⁄erent from the two other historical episodes, i.e. in-
versely related to the price response, nominal wages move in the same direction as prices at
longer horizons after the shock, thus counteracting the required adjustment of real wages
(i.e. nominal wages fall after a positive technology shock) and considerably amplifying
the ultimate repercussions of the shock on in￿ ation. This pattern of time variation in the
nominal wage response across the three in￿ ation regimes covered by our analysis hence
supports the notion that the incidence of second-round e⁄ects and, as a consequence, the
occurrence of wage-price spirals in response to supply side shocks and accompanying in-
￿ ation variability can be linked to the monetary policy regime. This hypothesis is further
supported by examining real wage adjustment over time. The incidence of second-round
e⁄ects and strong wage indexation should also result in more real wage rigidity after a
technology shock, which is exactly what we ￿nd for the "Great In￿ ation" period.
the higher in￿ ation uncertainty is, the greater is the likelihood of indexation.9
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We then continue our analysis by investigating the role of the monetary policy rule
and the degree of wage indexation in explaining the above-described stylized facts using
a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The results of model-
based simulations suggest that variations over time in both the policy rule parameters and
the degree of wage indexation simultaneously are needed in order to match the stylized
facts established by the empirical analysis. To be more speci￿c, the simulations reveal
that a policy rule with an aggressive response to in￿ ation together with a very low degree
of wage indexation can reproduce the reaction patterns of nominal wages and prices to
a technology shock found for the episodes before and after the "Great In￿ ation", i.e. an
increase of nominal wages supporting the required increase in real wages, while prices fall.
Altering the policy rule towards very poor in￿ ation stabilization can reproduce a positive
co-movement of the long-run response of nominal wages and prices to a technology shock,
but totally fails to generate the magnitudes of the e⁄ects in the 1970s. These magnitudes
can only be matched with a combination of a weakly in￿ ation stabilizing monetary policy
rule and considerable wage indexation. On the other hand, when we consider a model
with only a high degree of wage indexation, together with a strongly in￿ ation stabilizing
policy rule, the simulations can reproduce neither the magnitudes of the impulse responses
in the 1970s, nor those in the preceding and subsequent periods. This ￿nding supports
a point made by Fischer (1983), who shows in a simple macroeconomic model that the
association between all aspects of indexation and in￿ ation depends on the monetary and
￿scal policies being followed by the government.
Accordingly, only the combination of changes in both the policy rule and wage index-
ation simultaneously can explain the variation of the conditional volatility of price and
wage in￿ ation after technology shocks over time, suggesting that time variation in the
parameters of a central bank reaction function and the degree of wage indexation in the
U.S. were two sides of the same coin, i.e. the monetary policy regime. A weakly in￿ a-
tion stabilizing policy rule is conducive to high and volatile in￿ ation. This fosters the
use of wage indexation clauses as protection against in￿ ation uncertainty, which in turn
contributes to in￿ ation uncertainty by amplifying the e⁄ects of in￿ ationary shocks. On
the other hand, a regime of price stability requires a strong in￿ ation stabilizing policy rule10
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and reduces the need for protection against in￿ ation uncertainty, thus mitigating wage
indexation. A lower degree of wage indexation in turn reduces the e⁄ect of in￿ ationary
shocks, thus further contributing to price stability. Hence, counterfactual experiments
in the context of the "Great In￿ ation" and "Great Moderation" literature should take
both features of the monetary policy regime into account. Furthermore, our ￿nding that
labor market dynamics and particularly the existence of second-round e⁄ects via wages
are likely to be dependent on the policy regime also implies that hard-wiring a certain
degree of wage indexation in macro models like the ones of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007) is potentially misleading when changes in the
monetary policy regime are analyzed. In particular, the degree of wage indexation is not
structural in the sense of Lucas (1976), a point which is also made and shown by Benati
(2008) for in￿ ation persistence.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present
the empirical evidence on time variation in U.S. wage dynamics. We ￿rst discuss the
methodology and some reduced form evidence on possible wage indexation, before we
report the results of the estimated e⁄ects of technology shocks over time. In section 3,
we propose a standard DSGE model to evaluate the role of the monetary policy rule and
the degree of indexation in explaining the estimated time variation. Finally, section 4
concludes.
2 Time variation in wage dynamics - empirical evidence
2.1 A Bayesian VAR with time-varying parameters
To estimate the impact of technology shocks on wage and in￿ ation dynamics, we use
a VAR(p) model with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility in the spirit of
Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005), Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007). We
consider the following reduced form representation:
yt = ct + B1;tyt￿1 + ::: + Bp;tyt￿p + ut ￿ X0
t￿t + ut (1)11
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where yt is a vector of observed endogenous variables, i.e. output (real GDP), prices (GDP
de￿ ator), nominal wages (hourly compensation in the non-farm business sector) and the
interest rate (three-months Treasury bill rate).5 All variables are transformed to non-
annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rates by taking the ￿rst di⁄erence of the natural
logarithm, except the interest rate which remains in levels. The overall sample covers the
period 1947Q1-2008Q1, but the ￿rst ten years of data are used as a training sample to
generate the priors for the actual sample period. The lag length of the VAR is set to p = 2
which is su¢ cient to capture the dynamics in the system. The time-varying intercepts and
lagged coe¢ cients are stacked in ￿t to obtain the state-space representation of the model.
The ut of the observation equation are heteroskedastic disturbance terms with zero mean
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Let ￿t be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At (stacked by rows)
and ht be the vector containing the diagonal elements of Ht. Following Primiceri (2005),
the three driving processes of the system are postulated to evolve as follows:
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t ￿t ￿ N (0;Q) (3)
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t ￿t ￿ N(0;S) (4)
lnhi;t = lnhi;t￿1 + ￿i￿i;t ￿i;t ￿ N(0;1) (5)
The time-varying parameters ￿t and ￿t are modeled as driftless random walks. The
elements of the vector of volatilities ht = [h1;t;h2;t;h3;t;h4;t]
0 are assumed to evolve as
geometric random walks independent of each other. The error terms of the three transition
5 The data series were taken from the St. Louis FRED database.12
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equations are independent of each other and of the innovations of the observation equation.
In addition, we impose a block-diagonal structure for S of the following form:


























so that the covariance states can
be estimated equation by equation.
We estimate the above model using Bayesian methods (Markov Chain Monte Carlo al-
gorithm). The priors for the initial states of the regression coe¢ cients, the covariances and
the log volatilities are assumed to be normally distributed, independent of each other and
independent of the hyperparameters. Particularly, the priors are calibrated on the point
estimates of a constant-coe¢ cient VAR estimated over the training sample period. The
posterior distribution is simulated by sequentially drawing from the conditional posterior
of four blocks of parameters: the coe¢ cients, the simultaneous relations, the variances and
the hyperparameters. For further details of the implementation and MCMC algorithm,
we refer to Primiceri (2005), Benati and Mumtaz (2007) and Baumeister and Peersman
(2008). We perform 50,000 iterations of the Bayesian Gibbs sampler but keep only every
10th draw in order to mitigate the autocorrelation among the draws. After a "burn-in"
period of 50,000 iterations, the sequence of draws of the four blocks from their respective
conditional posteriors converges to a sample from the joint posterior distribution. We
ascertain that our chain has converged to the ergodic distribution by performing the usual
set of convergence tests (see Primiceri 2005; Benati and Mumtaz 2007). In total, we collect
5000 simulated values from the Gibbs chain on which we base our structural analysis.
2.2 Wage indexation over time - some reduced form evidence
To have a ￿rst impression about time variation in wage indexation, Figure 2 reports at
each point in time the median, 16th and 84th percentiles of the long-run multiplier e⁄ect
of lagged price in￿ ation on wage in￿ ation, obtained from the posterior of the reduced form13
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VAR. Some caution is required when interpreting the results since these ￿gures do not
capture indexation within the quarter, that is only lagged indexation e⁄ects are captured.
However, given the fact that wages are mostly adjusted with some lag, the ￿gures should
give at least some indication of possible time variation in wage indexation to past in￿ ation
rates.6 They can also be interpreted as a causality test. From the next subsection onwards,
when we identify structural innovations, also immediate e⁄ects will be taken into account.
The charts illustrate already a lot of time variation that is consistent with the con-
jecture that wage indexation could be linked to the monetary policy regime. Speci￿cally,
Figure 2 shows that the impact of lagged price in￿ ation on wage in￿ ation was relatively
high at the beginning of our sample period, after which we observe a decline to an insigni￿-
cant impact in the mid 1960s. From the mid 1960s onwards, however, we ￿nd an increased
and signi￿cant impact of lagged in￿ ation until the early 1980s, after which the sum of the
coe¢ cients became again insigni￿cant up until today. This pattern matches more or less
the time variation in COLA coverage shown in Figure 1. The estimates also con￿rm a
causal e⁄ect from prices on wages during the "Great In￿ ation", which is a precondition
for triggering wage-price spirals.
2.3 Impact of technology shocks - stylized facts
We next analyze wage and price dynamics in a more structural manner by focusing on the
dynamic e⁄ects of technological innovations. Technological disturbances are particularly
interesting for the examination of time variation of possible second-round e⁄ects since they
should move prices and wages in opposite directions, unless this is prevented by strong
wage indexation. More speci￿cally, in contrast to monetary policy or other demand-side
shocks, labor supply or wage mark-up shocks, a favorable technology shock is expected
to generate a positive e⁄ect on (real) wages, while prices should decline. In section 2.3.1,
we brie￿ y discuss the identi￿cation strategy which we borrow from Peersman and Straub
(2009), and the estimation results are presented in section 2.3.2.
6 Note that in standard DSGE models, wages are always indexed to past in￿ ation rates. Notice also
that prices can predict wages due to the structure of the economy, which is not necessarily via indexation.14
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2.3.1 Identi￿cation
For the identi￿cation of technology shocks in a structural VAR, Peersman and Straub
(2009) derive a set of sign restrictions that are consistent with a large class of DSGE
models and robust for parameter uncertainty. Peersman and Straub (2009) use this sign
restrictions model-based identi￿cation strategy to estimate the impact of technology shocks
on hours worked and employment. We impose the same restrictions in the above described
VAR with time-varying parameters.7 Speci￿cally, positive technology shocks are identi￿ed
as shocks with a non-negative e⁄ect on output and real wages and non-positive e⁄ects
on prices. These restrictions, which are imposed the ￿rst four quarters after the shock,
are su¢ cient to uniquely disentangle the innovations from monetary policy, aggregate
demand and labor market disturbances. In particular, expansionary monetary policy and
other aggregate demand shocks are expected to have a positive e⁄ect on prices, while
expansionary labor market innovations such as labor supply or wage mark-up shocks are
typically characterized by a fall in real wages.8 Notice that the nominal wage response to
a technology shock is left unconstrained at all horizons. Note also that, while the shock
is labelled as a technology shock, it could still comprise other supply-side shocks such
as commodity price or price mark-up shocks. In the context of our analysis, however, a
further decomposition is not required.
2.3.2 Results
Figure 3 displays the median impulse responses of real GDP, the GDP de￿ ator, the nomi-
nal interest rate, real and nominal wages to a one standard deviation technology shock for
7 Peersman and Straub (2009) propose this identi￿cation strategy with sign restrictions as an alternative
to Gali￿ s (1999) long-run restrictions. The latter, however, cannot be implemented in our time-varying
SVAR. To keep the number of variables manageable, we do not have hours worked or labor productivity
as one of the variables in the model. The approach of Peersman and Straub (2009) does instead not need
these variables for identi￿cation purposes. Imposing long-run neutrality of non-technological disturbances
in a model where the underlying structure and dynamics change over time is also something di¢ cult to
implement without making additional assumptions. See also Dedola and Neri (2007) for a similar sign
restrictions approach.
8As a robustness check we reestimated the VAR with the full set of shocks identi￿ed simultaneously
(i.e. monetary policy, aggregate demand, labour market as well as technology shocks) and found that the
results for the technology shocks were not a⁄ected. Hence, we only report the results for the single-shock
identi￿cation scheme. The results of the estimation with the full set of shocks identi￿ed are available upon
request.15
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horizons up to 28 quarters at each point in time spanning the period 1957Q1 to 2008Q1.
The estimated responses have been accumulated and are shown in levels.9 The responses
reveal that there is considerable time variation in the dynamic e⁄ects of technology shocks.
This is demonstrated even more clearly in Figure 4, where the time-varying median re-
sponses of output, real wages, prices and nominal wages are plotted respectively 0 and
28 quarters after the shock, together with the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior
distribution. Since it is not possible to uniquely identify the innovation variances of the
structural shocks, it is also not possible to exactly pin-down to which extent the time
variation is due to changes in the sizes of the shocks or in the way they are transmitted
to the economy.10 However, by carefully examining how the trends and correlations be-
tween impulse responses have evolved over time, it is still possible to come up with some
meaningful interpretations.
A ￿rst result that emerges from the inspection of the impulse responses is a weaker
impact of an average technology shock on economic activity since the early 1980s, a break
date which coincides with the start of the "Great Moderation". In contrast to this, there
is no evidence of a reduced e⁄ect of technology shocks on real wages. The short-run e⁄ect
is even found to have slightly increased over time, while the long-run e⁄ect has remained
at the elevated levels reached in the early 1970s. This result is in line with recent micro
evidence reported by Davis and Kahn (2008), who document that the "Great Moderation"
was not associated with a reduction in household income volatility. The most striking time-
9 Impulse response functions are computed as the di⁄erence between two conditional expectations with
and without the exogenous shock:
IRFt+k = E [yt+k j "t;!t] ￿ E [yt+k j !t]
where yt+k contains the forecasts of the endogenous variables at horizon k, !t represents the current
information set and "t is the current disturbance term. At each point in time the information set we
condition upon contains the actual values of the lagged endogenous variables and a random draw of the
model parameters and hyperparameters. In the ￿gures, we show the median impulse responses for each
quarter based on 500 draws. The impulse response function of the real wage for each draw is obtained via
the response of the nominal wage rate and the GDP de￿ ator.
10 This is a well-known problem when VAR results are compared across di⁄erent samples. Only the
impact of an "average" shock on a number of variables can be measured. Consequently, it is not possible
to know exactly whether the magnitude of an average shock has changed or the reaction of the economy
(economic structure) to this shock, unless an arbitrary normalization on one of the variables is done (e.g.
Gambetti, Pappa and Canova 2006 normalize on output or prices). See also Baumeister and Peersman
(2008) on this problem in the context of oil supply shocks.16
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variation however is a substantial stronger long-run impact of an average technology shock
on prices and nominal wages between the end of the 1960s and the early 1980s, i.e. during
the "Great In￿ ation" period, compared to the preceding and subsequent periods.
Gali, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2003) already detected a much stronger impact of a tech-
nology shock on in￿ ation in the pre-Volcker period (54Q1-79Q2) relative to the Volcker-
Greenspan era (82Q3-98Q3). Given the more muted in￿ ationary consequences we also
￿nd for the period before the start of the "Great In￿ ation", our results indicate that the
￿rst period they consider actually also covers two di⁄erent regimes.
The sign switch in the response of nominal wages to a technology shock at the start
and at the end of the "Great In￿ ation" is a stylized fact which has not been documented
before. As a matter of fact, the few studies that do analyze the impact of technology shocks
on wages using SVARs assuming constant parameters over the whole sample period, e.g.
Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) or Liu and Phaneuf (2007), conclude that there is only
a very weak negative or insigni￿cant response of nominal wage in￿ ation accompanying
a signi￿cant rise in real wages. The present analysis suggests that these ￿ndings are
misleading since they are ignoring considerable time variation in the reaction pattern of
wages. Before and after the high in￿ ation regime of the 1970s, nominal wages adjusted
to technology shocks in a way that supported the required adjustment of real wages.
During the "Great In￿ ation", in contrast, nominal wages moved in the same direction as
prices after the supply-side shock, thus even counteracting the required adjustment of real
wages. Interestingly, this is not the case for the contemporaneous impact. As can be seen
from Figure 4, the immediate response of nominal wages has always been positive after a
favorable technology shock, and even of a similar magnitude. Only after a few quarters,
there is a sign switch in the nominal wage reaction. The latter is more clearly visible in
Figure 5, which shows the pass-through of a technology shock to output, prices, interest
rates as well as real and nominal wages at three points in time: before (1960Q1), during
(1974Q1) and after (2000Q1) the "Great In￿ ation".
Another interesting result of the analysis is the time variation in the adjustment speed
of prices, real and nominal wages. As illustrated in Figure 5, adjustment patterns of these
variables look very similar for the periods before and after the "Great In￿ ation", where17
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we ￿nd an immediate adjustment of prices, nominal and especially real wages to their new
equilibrium values. In contrast, the adjustment of real wages is very sluggish in the 1970s.
This result points to a high degree of real wage rigidity following permanent technology
shocks in this period, with an estimated half-life of the overall real wage adjustment of
approximately one year (and even more).11
3 Explaining the stylized facts
3.1 Interpretation of the evidence
It appears implausible that only changes in the size of technology shocks are driving the
pattern of the responses of prices and nominal wages over time. If this were the case, then
we should see the same pattern of time variation in the impulse responses of the other
variables, which is not the case. Although we cannot pin-down the exact magnitude of the
shocks, the long-run (permanent) e⁄ects on output suggest that technology shocks could
have been bigger in the 1970s (see Figure 4).12 However, when we consider the long-run
e⁄ects on real wages, a variable which is also expected to be closely related to productivity
changes, the impact was not even stronger in the 1970s relative to more recent periods.
The time variation of the output e⁄ects is also much more subdued than the time variation
of the impact on nominal wages and prices. Furthermore, a di⁄erent size of the underlying
shocks over time cannot explain why the contemporaneous impact on nominal wages has
always been positive (and of a similar magnitude), whereas the long-run e⁄ects became
negative at the start of the "Great In￿ ation" and changed back to positive at the end of
this episode in the early 1980s. This sign switch in the reaction of nominal wages clearly
points to a structural change in the labor market.
A plausible explanation for the changing pattern in the responses of prices and nominal
wages is that second-round e⁄ects via wage indexation played an important role during
the "Great In￿ ation" so that technology disturbances during that period simultaneously
11 The conclusions are not altered if we select alternative quarters in each period. The half life is
calculated for each draw of the posterior independently.
12 Note that this ￿nding is not at odds with the "bad luck" hypothesis contributing to the "Great
In￿ ation".18
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triggered wage-price spirals giving rise to larger long-run e⁄ects of such shocks on wages
and prices, and hence increased in￿ ation variability.13 This hypothesis can also perfectly
explain the sign switch in the nominal wage response during the 1970s. Consider an
unfavorable technology shock. Whereas this shock has a downward impact on real wages,
also nominal wages tend to decline in the very short-run. The accompanying rise in prices,
however, generates a positive e⁄ect on nominal wages due to the second-round e⁄ects,
triggering a wage-price spiral resulting in a sign switch of the nominal wage response and
a positive long-run co-movement between prices and wages. Furthermore, a high level of
wage indexation is also consistent with the sluggish adjustment of real wages following a
technology shock that we found for the 1970s. In particular, a strong link between price
and wage dynamics due to explicit or implicit wage indexation hinders a fast adjustment
of the real wage, which is the ratio of the two, to its new equilibrium.
The existence of second-round e⁄ects via rising wages could be the consequence of ex-
plicit or implicit wage indexation schemes. As we have shown in Figure 1, the prevalence
of cost-of-living adjustment clauses in collective bargaining agreements increased consid-
erably during the 1970s, peaked in the late 1970s, and declined again afterwards. This
pattern ￿ts very well with the estimated time variation in wage dynamics. A detailed
analysis of the determinants of wage indexation is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
existing literature refers particularly to the role of in￿ ation uncertainty as the most impor-
tant determinant.14 The latter, however, corroborates very well with the "bad monetary
policy" hypothesis of the "Great In￿ ation". In particular, Gali, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs
(2003) ￿nd the Fed￿ s response to a technology shock in the Volcker-Greenspan period to
be consistent with an optimal monetary policy rule. For the Pre-Volcker period, in con-
trast, the Fed tended to overstabilize output at the cost of generating excessive in￿ ation
volatility. An insu¢ cient unconditional interest rate response to in￿ ation before Volcker
became the Fed￿ s chairman has also been brought forward by Judd and Rudebusch (1999),
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2002, 2005) among others.15
13 Note that when we identify additional shocks using the sign restrictions proposed by Peersman (2005),
a similar strong wage-price spiral in the 1970s shows up. These results are available upon request.
14 E.g. Holland (1986, 1995), Weiner (1986) or Ragan and Bratsberg (2000). Alternative reasons put
forward in this literature are changes in regulation, power of unions or competition.
15 Francis, Owyang and Theodorou (2005) ￿nd that the type of monetary policy rule also contributes19
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By conducting counterfactual simulations, a number of studies (e.g. Primiceri 2005;
Sims and Zha 2006; Canova and Gambetti 2006) conclude that this shift in the monetary
policy rule is unable to explain the changed macroeconomic dynamics and volatility over
time, hence questioning the monetary policy hypothesis. To the extent that improved
monetary policy has also provided a clear anchor for in￿ ation expectations, contributing
to reduced in￿ ation uncertainty, our analysis indicates that the additional e⁄ects via lower
wage indexation and contained second-round e⁄ects should also be taken into account.
What is striking, is that our results suggest that increased wage indexation itself in turn
leads to additional in￿ ation variability via second-round e⁄ects, thus further strengthening
the incentive to include cost-of-living adjustments in collective bargaining agreements. The
relevance of both features characterizing the monetary policy regime in explaining the time
variation in the reactions to a technology shock uncovered by our empirical analysis, and
in particular their interplay, is analyzed in more detail in the next subsection.
3.2 Dynamic e⁄ects of technology shocks in a DSGE model
To explore the sources of time variation more carefully, we use a standard DSGE model
with Calvo sticky prices and wages, price and wage indexation, habit formation, and a
conventional Taylor rule. The model can be considered as a simpli￿ed version of Smets and
Wouters (2007) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). Details of the model can be
found in the appendix. Since we focus on the role of changes in the monetary policy rule
and changes in wage indexation, we simulate the dynamics of a technology shock within
the model by varying the in￿ ation reaction parameter in the monetary policy rule and the
degree of wage indexation. For all simulations, the other parameters of the model are set
at the following baseline values: the discount factor ￿ = 0:99; the preference parameter
￿ = 3; habit persistence b = 0:9; degree of monopolistic competition in respectively the
goods and labor market ￿p = 6, ￿w = 10; Calvo price and wage parameters ￿p = 0:85,
￿w = 0:85; degree of price indexation ￿p = 0:6; coe¢ cient on output in the monetary
to cross-country di⁄erences in the e⁄ects of technology shocks. Bilbiie and Straub (2006) argue that
limited asset market participation before 1980 in the US (and the change thereof) is crucial in explaining
macroeconomic performance and monetary policy conduct. In this respect, the authors argue that Fed
policy in the Pre-Volcker era was closer to optimal than conventional wisdom dictates; policy may have
changed endogenously from passive to active due to the change in asset market participation.20
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policy rule ￿y = 0:5; and interest rate smoothing ￿r = 0:65.16 To match the empirical
set-up, we simulate the dynamic e⁄ects of a permanent technology shock in the model by
imposing ￿a = 1.
All results are reported in Figure 6. The ￿rst column reports the simulated dynamic
e⁄ects of a technology shock assuming a policy rule with a very weak reaction to in￿ ation
and no wage indexation by setting ￿￿ = 1:01 and ￿w = 0:0.17 As a benchmark to match the
stylized facts of the "Great In￿ ation", the graphs also show the estimated median impulse
responses for 1974Q1, together with 16th and 84 percentiles of the posterior. To match the
magnitude of a technology shock in the DSGE model, the VAR responses are normalized
to a 1 percent long-run increase of the output level. The similarity of the simulations
and the estimated output and real wage responses is high. The contemporaneous reaction
of the interest rate is also the same as in the data, and we do ￿nd a negative long-run
response of nominal wages. However, the simulated magnitudes of the e⁄ects on prices
and wages are much smaller than in the data. Hence, a policy rule with weak in￿ ation
stabilization alone cannot explain the stylized facts of technology shocks in the 1970s,
particularly not the wage dynamics and accompanying in￿ ation variability.
In the second column of Figure 6, we augment the model with wage indexation by
setting ￿w = 0:65. A relative high degree of wage indexation is clearly crucial to explain
the estimated magnitudes of the e⁄ects of technological innovations during the "Great
In￿ ation". More speci￿cally, we now ￿nd a substantial decline of nominal wages in the
long-run, counteracting the required adjustment of real wages and amplifying the ulti-
mate repercussions on prices. The in￿ ationary e⁄ects are almost double compared to a
16 The choices of the parameter values, e.g. Calvo parameters or habit persistence, are mainly determined
to capture the ￿ shapes￿ of the estimated impulse responses. We also experimented with possible time
variation of price indexation or alternative parameters for output and interest rate smoothing in the policy
rule, but the results of these experiments do not a⁄ect the conclusions, i.e. the consequences of varying
these parameters for price and wage dynamics are very limited. Accordingly, we can focus on the in￿ ation
parameter in the policy rule and the degree of wage indexation. These other simulations are available upon
request.
17 We impose an in￿ ation reaction parameter which is larger than 1 in order to avoid model indetermi-
nacy. We also simulated the model under indeterminacy using the mimum state variable approach (see
Lubik and Schorfheide 2004). The results of this exercise suggested that allowing for indeterminacy in this
way does not alter the conclusion of our analysis that a change in the in￿ ation reaction parameter in the
policy rule alone cannot explain the time variation in U.S. wage and price in￿ ation dynamics documented
in section 2.21
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situation without wage indexation. The initial nominal wage response in the model is
even positive,consistent with what we found in the data. Hence, second-round e⁄ects via
wage indexation must have been important in the 1970s, contributing to higher in￿ ation
variability. Interestingly, wage indexation alone can also not explain the stylized facts.
In column 3, we report the results of a simulation assuming a policy rule with a strong
reaction to in￿ ation (￿￿ = 2:8) combined with a high degree of wage indexation. Again,
it is impossible to match the estimated magnitudes from section 2, i.e. a weak in￿ ation
stabilizing monetary policy rule is also needed to explain the stylized facts of the 1970s. In
particular the interaction between policy rule parameter and wage indexation is crucial to
get the substantial in￿ ationary repercussions of technology shocks indicated by the empir-
ical analysis over this period. This can be illustrated with a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation. Whereas the long-run impact of a technology shock in the DSGE model on
prices increases by 63% when the in￿ ation reaction coe¢ cient in the policy rule is reduced
to a low level, and by 52% when only wage indexation is high, combining both raises the
ultimate e⁄ects by 197%. This ￿nding is consistent with Fischer (1983) who shows in a
simple theoretical model that the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of all aspects of indexation depends
on the monetary and ￿scal policy followed by the government.
Is it possible to get the positive long-run response of nominal wages from the period
before and after the "Great In￿ ation"? A shift in the monetary policy rule towards
aggressive in￿ ation stabilization, while still assuming the presence of a relatively high
level of wage indexation, clearly cannot. The long-run impact on nominal wages is still
negative. Furthermore, such a shift in the policy rule alone can also not explain the
magnitude of the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of technological innovations in more recent periods.
This is illustrated for 2000Q1 in the fourth column of Figure 6.18 The simulated e⁄ect
on in￿ ation is now too strong. To get the positive response of nominal wages and more
plausible values for the magnitudes, the assumption of high wage indexation also has to
be abandoned. As can be seen from the last column of Figure 6, a policy rule with a
strong reaction to in￿ ation together with low or no wage indexation is able to generate
magnitudes of impulse responses that are in line with the stylized facts.
18 Which is also the case for other quarters before and after the "Great In￿ ation".22
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In sum, only the combination of a policy rule with a low in￿ ation reaction coe¢ cient
and a high degree of wage indexation can explain U.S. wage dynamics and in￿ ation ￿ uc-
tuations following technology shocks during the "Great In￿ ation". On the other hand,
an aggressive policy rate response to in￿ ation combined with very low wage indexation is
needed to explain wage dynamics and in￿ ationary e⁄ects before and after this period. As
we have argued, however, the degree of wage indexation and the existence of second-round
e⁄ects is likely to be dependent on the monetary policy regime, and improved monetary
policy over time involves much more than only the monetary policy rule of the central
bank. In particular, both characteristics can be considered as two sides of the same coin,
namely monetary policy credibility, a feature which should be taken into account when
examining the implications of changes in the monetary policy regime.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the time-varying dynamic e⁄ects of technology shocks on a set
of key U.S. macroeconomic variables using data spanning the period 1947 till 2008. The
focus of the analysis is on time variation in wage dynamics, which has so far remained
unexplored in the literature. We ￿nd considerable time variation that can be linked to
the monetary policy regime. More speci￿cally, during the "Great In￿ ation", technology
shocks triggered second-round e⁄ects via mutually reinforcing feedback e⁄ects between
wages and prices, amplifying the ultimate e⁄ects on prices and hence increasing in￿ ation
variability. In contrast, before and after this period, nominal wages are found to move in
the same direction as the required adjustment of real wages and in the opposite direction
of the price response after technological innovations, contributing to a subdued impact on
in￿ ation and in￿ ation volatility.
Based on a standard DSGE model, we explore the explanations for these new stylized
facts. Model-based simulations suggest that variations over time in both the policy rule
parameters and the degree of wage indexation are needed in order to match the stylized
facts established by the empirical analysis. What is needed is the combination of a low
in￿ ation reaction parameter in the policy rule and a high degree of wage indexation in the23
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A Appendix - the DSGE model
A.1 Households
In the ￿rst step we present the optimization problem of a representative household denoted
by h. The household maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption Ch;t and ￿nancial













where ￿ is the discount factor and ￿ is the inverse of the elasticity of work e⁄ort with
respect to the real wage. The external habit variable Ht is assumed to be proportional to
aggregate past consumption:
Ht = bCt￿1 (8)
Household￿ s utility depends positively on the change in Ch;t, and negatively on hours










Nh;t + Dh;t + Th;t +
Bh;t
Pt
Here, Rt is the nominal interest rate, Wh;t is the nominal wage, Th;t are lump-sum taxes
paid to the ￿scal authority, Pt is the price level and Dh;t is the dividend income. In the fol-
lowing we will assume the existence of state-contingent securities that are traded amongst
households in order to insure households against variations in household-speci￿c wage
income. As a result where possible, we neglect the indexation of individual households.
The maximization of the objective function with respect to consumption, bond hold-
ing and next period capital stock can be summarized by the following standard Euler25
ECB












There are two types of ￿rms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms indexed
by f 2 [0;1], each of which produces a single di⁄erentiated intermediate good, Yf;t, and a
distinct set of perfectly competitive ￿rms, which combine all the intermediate goods into
a single ￿nal good, Yt.
A.2.1 Final-Good Firms











where ￿p;t is a variable determining the degree of imperfect competition in the goods
market. Minimizing the cost of production subject to the aggregation constraint (11)
results in demand for the di⁄erentiated intermediate goods as a function of their price Pf;t
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A.2.2 Intermediate-Goods Firms
Each intermediate-goods ￿rm f produces its di⁄erentiated output using a production
function of a standard Cobb Douglas form:
Yf;t = AtNf;t (13)





Following Calvo (1983), intermediate-goods producing ￿rms receive permission to opti-
mally reset their price in a given period t with probability 1 ￿ ￿p. All ￿rms that receive
permission to reset their price choose the same price P￿
f;t. Each ￿rm f receiving permission









subject to the demand for its output (12) where ￿t;t+k is the stochastic discount factor of
the households owing the ￿rm and
Df;t = Pf;t Yf;t ￿ MCtYf;t
are period-t nominal pro￿ts which are distributed as dividends to the households.
Hence, we obtain the following ￿rst-order condition for the ￿rm￿ s optimal price-setting



















With the intermediate-goods prices Pf;t set according to equation (14), the evolution27
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There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive unions indexed over the same range
as the households, h 2 [0;1], which act as wage setters for the di⁄erentiated labor services
supplied by the households taking the aggregate nominal wage rate Wt and aggregate labor
demand Nt as given. Following Calvo (1983), unions receive permission to optimally reset
their nominal wage rate in a given period t with probability 1￿￿w. All unions that receive
permission to reset their wage rate choose the same wage rate W￿
h;t. Each union h that
receives permission to optimally reset its wage rate in period t maximizes the household￿ s
lifetime utility function (7) subject to its intertemporal budget constraint (9) and the









where ￿w;t is a variable determining the degree of imperfect competition in the labor
market. As a result, we obtain the following ￿rst-order condition for the union￿ s optimal
















￿ (1 + ￿w) MRSt+k
￿
= 0 (15)
where MRSt = N
￿
h;t(Ct￿Ht) stands for the marginal rate of substitution, and ￿w deter-
mines the degree of wage indexation. Aggregate labor demand, Nt, and the aggregate


















With the labor-speci￿c wage rates Wh;t set according to (15), the evolution of the aggregate















A.4 Market Clearing and Shock Process
The labor market is in equilibrium when the demand for the index of labor services by the
intermediate-goods ￿rms equals the di⁄erentiated labor services supplied by households at
the wage rates set by unions. Furthermore, the ￿nal-good market is in equilibrium when
the supply by the ￿nal-good ￿rms equals the demand by households:
Yt = Ct
The model is simulated in its log-linearized form, i.e. small letters will characterize in
the following percentage deviations form the steady state. The exogenous shock process
follows an AR(1) described by the following equations:
at = ￿aat￿1 + ￿a
t (16)
whereby we set ￿a = 1; implying a random walk productivity shock which induces perma-
nent e⁄ects. Finally, monetary policy follows a standard log-linearized Taylor rule:
rt = ￿rrt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)(￿y￿yt + ￿￿￿t) (17)
where ￿r is a parameter determining the degree of interest rate smoothing, while ￿y and
￿￿ represent the elasticity of the interest rate to output and in￿ ation respectively.29
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A.5 Equilibrium dynamics














(wt ￿ at) (18)
￿w
t = ￿Et￿w
t+1 ￿ ￿w￿￿t + ￿w￿￿t￿1 +
1
(1 + ￿)




@ ￿nt ￿ wt
+ 1




wt = wt￿1 + ￿w;t ￿ ￿t (20)
rt ￿ Et￿t+1 =
1
1 ￿ b
(Etct+1 ￿ (1 ￿ b)ct + bct￿1) (21)
rt = ￿rrt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)(￿y￿yt + ￿￿￿t) (22)
A.6 Stationary equilibrium of the model
In this section, we present the stationary equilibrium of our model. To induce stationarity,
we divide consumption, output, real wage by the level of the permanent supply shock At.
We denote transformed variables consumption and real wages by e Ct = Ct
At and f Wt = Wt
PtAt:
Furthermore, we label log-deviations of a stationary variable e Xt from its steady-state


































￿e wt ￿ b




e wt = e wt￿1 + ￿w;t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿at (25)
rt ￿ Et￿t+1 =
1
1 ￿ b
(Ete ct+1 ￿ (1 ￿ b)e ct + be ct￿1 ￿ b￿at) (26)
rt = ￿rrt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)(￿y (￿e ct ￿ ￿at) ￿ +￿￿￿t) (27)
Note that due to market clearing e ct = e yt:
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Figure 3 - Time-varying impulse response functions to a technology shock
Note: Median impulse response function obtained from the posterior distributions.37
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